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ARTICLES

Takings Term II: New Tools for
Attacking and Defending Environmental
and Land-Use Regulation
MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF*

INTRODUCTION

The 1991 October Term of the United States Supreme Court can
legitimately be called "Takings Term II," a sequel to the Court's
regulatory takings activism of the 1986 October Term.' Unlike the
4
previous trio of Keystone,2 First English,3 and Nollan, however, the
7
Court's contributions in Lucas,5 Yee, 6 and PFZ are as significant for
* Professor of Law and History, University of Richmond. This Article is
based in part on a.lecture presented to the Environmental Law Symposium, sponsored
by the Law Review of the Northern Illinois University College of Law, on March 4,
1993. The author thanks Leslie Kelleher for her keen criticism and John Byrum for
his most capable research and computer graphics assistance.
1. The following is but a sampling of the reaction to the Court's Taking
Trilogy during the 1986 October Term: Michael M. Berger, Happy Birthday, Constitution: The Supreme Court Establishes New Ground Rules for Land-Use Planning,
20 URB. LAW. 735 (1988); Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection,
1987 SuP. CT. REv. 1 (1987); Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1600 (1988); Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Keystone Bituminous Coal, First English and
Nollan: A Framework for Accommodation?, 34 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L.
173 (1988); Charles L. Siemon & Wendy U. Larsen, The Taking Issue Trilogy: The
Beginning of the End, 33 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 169 (1988).
2. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987)
(dismissing facial challenge to Pennsylvania Subsidence Act).
3. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (recognizing availability of compensation for temporary
taking effected by regulation).
4. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (taking occurred
when beachfront house construction was conditioned upon dedication of public
easement to cross beach). There was a fourth takings decision during the 1986
October Term, involving estates law rather than land-use and environmental regulation. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987) (successful takings challenge brought
against escheat statute applicable to Native American allotted lands).
5. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
6. Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 13

what the Justices did not say as for what they contributed to the
pages of the United States Reports.
Because these cases pose so many yet unanswered questions,8 it
would be imprudent and premature to predict in this article how
discrete questions of environmental regulation will certainly be resolved by the federal courts. 9 Instead, what we can do is examine how
these three cases and their precursors can be used as tools by advocates
in future struggles over the legitimacy and desirability of environmental and land-use protective schemes.
Part II examines the principal contributions made by Lucas, Yee,
and PFZ to the ongoing (and decades-old) takings dialogue,' 0 while
highlighting those key questions left unanswered. Part III introduces
three charts that describe judicial behavior in, and "plot" the law of,
takings law to this point (including recent controversial opinions from
the United States Claims Court); and addresses some pieces of the
puzzle that remain undeciphered. Part IV presents two sets of factors,
derived from takings case law, that can be used as part of either an
attack strategy for private sector advocates or a strategy for those
defending public sector actors in disputes over the legality of environmental and land-use restrictions. The article closes by exploring three
7. PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 928 F.2d 28 (1st Cir.), cert. granted,
112 S. Ct. 414 (1991), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 112 S. Ct. 1151
(1992). As in Takings Terms I, there was a fourth takings case as well. See National
Passenger R.R. Corp. v. Boston and Maine Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1394 (1992) (Section
562(d) of Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 does not violate public use requirement
of Fifth Amendment).
8. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 70-74 (conceptual severance), and
text accompanying notes 131-44 (substantive due process).
9. For some early ruminations concerning the impact of Lucas, see Robert M.
Frank, Inverse Condemnation Litigation in the 1990s-The Uncertain Legacy of the
Supreme Court's Lucas and Yee Decisions, 43 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 85
(1993); Barry M. Hartman, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: The Takings
Test Turns a Corner, 23

ENVTL.

L. REP. 10003 (Jan. 1993); John A. Humbach,

Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance and the Takings Clause, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
1 (1993); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: Colloquium, 10 PACE ENVTL. L.
REV. 5 (1992); John R. Nolon, Footprintsin the Shifting Sands of the Isle of Palms:
A Practical Analysis of Regulatory Takings Cases, 8 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1
(1992); Barry I. Pershkow & Robert F. Housman, In the Wake of Lucas v. South

Carolina Coastal Council: A Critical Look at Six Questions Practitioners Should Be
Asking, 23 ENVTL. L. REP. 10008 (Jan. 1993); Symposium, Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1369 (1993).
10. See CHARLES M. HAAR AND MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, LAND-USE PLANNING
879-88 (4th ed. 1989) (excerpts from leading takings cases). The main focus of this
article is on takings by means of regulation, not the affirmative exercise of eminent
domain by the state. See id. at 780-826 (cases involving legitimacy of public use). See
also infra Table I.
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stages of takings judicial decision-making-bright-line formalism, relativist balancing, and anti-regulatory skepticism- and considers how
the advocates and commentators on either side of this critical issue
would benefit greatly from carefully considering the jurisprudential
context of their disputes and of the solutions they offer the court.
II.

A NEW TAKINGS TRILOGY: LUCAS, YEE, AND PFZ (One Win,
One Loss, and One Nondecision)

The Supreme Court's decision to hear three landowner challenges
to allegedly unconstitutional environmental and land-use regulations
or practices caused great anticipation and anxiety among practitioners,
commentators, and other legal professionals in the private and public
sectors." When the outcomes are totaled, the final score is one win
(Yee for the public, Lucas for the private), one loss (Lucas for the
public, Yee for the private), and one nondecision (PFZ). For those
who have long waited for a dramatic signal from the Court that the
days of toleration of the abuse of private property are over, this
reckoning was disappointing.' 2 The tally was equally frustrating for
their counterparts, who hoped that the less conservative members of
the Rehnquist Court would halt Justice Antonin Scalia's "Lochnerizing" at the Nollans' dry sand property line. 3 To some commentators
11. See, e.g., Nolon, supra note 9, at 1-2 (footnotes omitted):
The U.S Supreme Court granted certiorari during its 1991 term to review
Groups
three decisions that riveted the attention of the land use bar ....
as diverse as the National Cattlemen's Association, the Property Rights
Preservation Association, and the Pacific Legal Foundation urged the Court
to decide for the property owner. Entities ranging from the Municipal Art
Society of New York, the Sierra Club, and the American Planning Association argued in favor of the State of South Carolina.
12. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A
Tangled Web of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1369 (1993) (footnote omitted):
Although anticipated before its arrival, last term's decision in [Lucas] has
[Wihat the Court gave with one
been rightly regarded as anticlimactic ....
hand, it took away with the other .... The proper status of permanent but
partial restrictions on land use was not explicitly addressed, but these may
now be regarded as legitimate and non-compensable exercises under the state
police power. Yet even with total regulatory takings, Justice Scalia stopped
short of embracing Lucas's theory that the total loss of beneficial use
constitutes a per se compensable taking.
13. See Robert A. Williams, Jr., Euclid's Lochnerian Legacy, in ZONING AND
THE AmEicAN DREAM: PROMISES STILL TO KEEP 278, 293 (Charles M. Haar & Jerold
S. Kayden eds. 1989) (footnote omitted):
The Nollan majority interpreted the Fifth Amendment's takings clause as
requiring aggressive judicial scrutiny of police power regulations affecting
The deferential
fundamentally regarded rights in private property ....
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who focused on this score, the 1991 October Term was no match for
the irony of Keystone (PennsylvaniaCoal revisited), 4 followed by the
didacticism of First English (putting the lie to metaphorical takings), 5
and capped off by the activism of Nollan (upping the nexus ante).16
But, as in sports, this final score belies the true nature of the contest.
Each of these cases has added "law" to the takings field, through
the articulation of new principles, the exposition of additional clarifications and distinctions, or the refusal to expand doctrine in a new
direction. The exploration of these contributions-and not the detailed
exegesis of each set of opinions' 7-is the focus of this part of the
article.
This writer has noted elsewhere that, since the Supreme Court
first placed its imprimatur on zoning in Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co.," "the typical land use dispute pits a disgruntled pr6perty

discourse of [earlier Supreme Court cases] requiring that a land use ordinance
must be merely rationally related to a public purpose in order to avoid a
constitutional challenge was directly confronted and overcome by Justice
Scalia's full-scale revival of Lochnerian substantive due process analysis.
14. The Keystone majority took pains to distinguish the modern Subsidence
Act from the Kohler Act that had been struck down in Pennsylvania Coal. See
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 484-89 (1987).
15. Until the issue was settled in First English, some commentators insisted
that Justice Holmes was speaking metaphorically in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922), when he said "if regulation goes too far it will be recognized
as a taking." See, e.g., Charles L. Siemon, Of Regulatory Takings and Other Myths,
1 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 105 (1985).
16. See, e.g., DANIEL R. MANDELIER, LAND USE LAW § 2.23, at 44 (2d ed.
1988): "This holding [in Nollan] modifies previous taking doctrine. It means the
Court will apply a heightened standard of judicial review when it considers whether
governmental interests are advanced by a land use regulation." See also Jerold S.
Kayden, Land-Use Regulations, Rationality, and Judicial Review: The RSVP in the
Nollan Invitation (Part I), 23 URB. LAW. 301 (1991).

17. It is hard for a lawyer-especially an academic one-to forego the opportunity that a law review article offers to point out the court's mistakes, educate
judges as to where to take this area of the law in the future, or interpret the most
disagreeable sections of the majority's opinion so narrowly that it would be nearly
impossible for a future court to make the same mistake. Indeed, this author has
done each of the above in print. See, e.g., Michael A. Wolf, Accommodating
Tensions in the Coastal Zone: An Introduction and Overview, 25 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 7, 16-19 (1985); Michael A. Wolf, Three Strikes But Not Out: Hamilton Bank and
the Takings Question, FLA. B. J., May 1986, at 65. Still, the overriding purpose of
this Article-to consider the Supreme Court's recent regulatory takings offerings as
tools for those advocates conducting the ongoing legal debate between regulators and
private property owners-militates against the most abstract indulgence.
18. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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owner ... against the public zoning decision makers who have failed
to appreciate the extent of the economic harm caused by their acts or
failures to act."' 9 This paradigm, which applies as well in cases
involving nonzoning land-use restriction and modern environmental
regulations, holds for each of the cases discussed in this article. Thus,
we can reduce the germane variables for the conflicts studied here to
three: (1) "private use," that is, the nature of the landowner's
activities (actual or proposed) on the regulated realty; (2) "public
regulation," that is, the nature (ends and means) of the governmental
restriction; and (3) "legal outcome," that is, the conclusion of the
highest court considering the matter as to the legitimacy of the public
regulation (on its face or as applied to the private use).
A.

LUCAS: ONCE MORE ONTO THE BEACH

The three variables in Lucas are quite similar to those found in
controversial opinion presented by the Court during Takings
most
the
Term I: Justice Scalia's offering in Nollan. As in that Californiabased dispute, the private use in Lucas was beachfront residence.
Unlike the Nollans, 20 however, Lucas did not defy the challenged
21
public regulation-South Carolina's Beachfront Management Act, a
coastal preservation measure that outlawed nearly all new construction
on specially protected parcels.2 2 In common with the Nollans, however, the legal outcome of Lucas's challenge was a finding that the
23
public regulation violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment
as applied to the petitioner's private use. In other words, like the

19. Michael A. Wolf, The Prescience and Centrality of Euclid v. Ambler, in

ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM: PROMISES STILL TO KEEP

252, 253 (Charles M.

Haar & Jerold S. Kayden eds. 1989).
20. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 829-30 (1987):
"The Commission appealed to the California Court of Appeal. While that appeal
was pending, the Nollans satisfied the condition on their option to purchase by
tearing down the bungalow and building the new house, and bought the property.
They did not notify the Commission that they were taking that action."
21. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-10 to 48-39-360 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
22. See Nollan, 112 S. Ct. at 2889-90 (footnote and citation omitted): "[Ujnder
the Act construction of occupiable improvements was flatly prohibited seaward of a
line drawn 20 feet landward of, and parallel to, the baseline. The Act provided no
exceptions."

23. "[Nlor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Takings Clause applies to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239
(1897).
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Nollans, Lucas was successful in convincing the Court that the state

had (most likely? overstepped its bounds.

Four aspects of Lucas are especially worthy of close study by

those seeking guidance for similar conflicts in the future: the total
taking allegation, the Court's choice of a categorical methodology,
the articulation of a nuisances-plus exception, and Justice Scalia's
invitation to reopen the parcel-as-a-whole debate.
1. A Total Taking

According to the state trial court, the South Carolina Court of
Common Pleas, "Lucas's two beachfront lots [were] rendered value-

less by respondent's enforcement of the coastal-zone construction
ban." ' 25 Scalia, speaking for a bare majority of five Justices, accepted
this finding over the Council's objections 26 and despite the misgivings
of the other four Justices. Justice Kennedy, though he concurred in
the decision to remand the case to the state courts, deemed the trial
court's conclusion on value "a curious finding. ' 27 To support his
conclusion that "the writ of certiorari [was] granted improvidently,"
Justice Souter characterized the finding as "highly questionable,"
particularly in the light of the Court's takings precedent. 21 In his
dissent, Justice Stevens's skepticism was palpable as he noted that
"on the present record it is entirely possible that petitioner has
suffered no injury-in-fact even if the state statute was unconstitutional
when he filed this lawsuit." ' 29 Justice Blackmun, also in dissent, went
even further as he applied the label "almost certainly erroneous" to
the finding that the property had lost all economic value. 30 The finding
24. The "most likely" was removed by the South Carolina Supreme Court on
remand, as that court could find no common-law-based rationale for the total taking.
See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 486 (S.C. 1992):
"Coastal Council has not persuaded us that any common law basis exists by which
it could restrain Lucas's desired use of his land; nor has our research uncovered any
such common law principle." The case was then sent back down to the circuit court
for a determination of "actual damages Lucas ha[d] sustained as the result of his
being temporarily deprived of the use of his property."
25. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 2896 (1992)
(footnote omitted).
26. Because the Council did not challenge the finding of no value in its Brief
in Opposition to Lucas's Petition for Certiorari, and because the state supreme court
assumed no value as well, the Court would not hear the argument raised in the Brief
for Respondent that that finding was erroneous. Id. at 2996 n.9.
27. Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
28. Id. at 2925 (Souter, J., separate statement).
29. Id. at 2917-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 2908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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was not only controversial but also noteworthy in other respects.
First, public sector advocates frightened by the holding of the
Lucas Court can find solace in the fact that the occasions in which
of all value are, in Scalia's words,
government deprives landowners
"relatively rare situations." ' 3' The great bulk of disputes concerning
restrictive land-use and environmental regulations involves alleged

deprivations of most, but not all, of the value held by the affected
landowner.12 Even after the Lucas opinion was announced, landowners
suffered a
have had a difficult time convincing courts that they have
33
officials.
government
of
total deprivation at the hands
31. Id. at 2894.

32. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Putting the CorrectSpin on Lucas, 45 STAN.
L. REv. 1411, 1427 (footnote omitted): "because environmental protection laws
almost never result in total economic deprivations, that categorical presumption will
rarely apply. Instead the negative implication of the category's nonapplicability will
dominate the lower courts' taking analysis."
33. In the relatively short time since the Lucas decision was announced, several
state and federal courts have cited the case in regulatory takings challenges. In the
following cases, the courts refused to find that the challenged public regulation
effected a taking: McAndrews v. Fleet Bank of Massachusetts, 989 F.2d 13 (1st Cir.
1993), affirming McAndrews v. New Bank of New England, 796 F. Supp. 613 (D.
Mass. 1992) (Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) provision preventing lessor from terminating lease with bank in receivership);
Reahard v. Lee County, 968 F.2d 1131 (lth Cir. 1992) (county designation of
property as resource protection area); Azul Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles,
973 F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1992) (vacancy provision in mobile home rent control
ordinance); Carpenter v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 804 F. Supp. 1316 (D.
Nev. 1992) (regional planning authority's 8-month moratorium on new construction
banning single-family residential use); Naegle Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of
Durham, 803 F. Supp. 1068 (M.D. N.C. 1992) (city ordinance prohibiting commercial,
off-premises advertising signs after expiration of amortization period); Burns Harbor
Fish Co., Inc. v. Ralston, 800 F. Supp. 722 (S.D. Ind. 1992) (ordinance banning gill
net fishing); Presault v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 69 (1992) (National Trail Systems
Act postponed reversioners' use of former railroad rights-of-way); Tabb Lakes, Inc.
v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 1334 (1992) (jurisdictionally invalid cease and desist order
by Army Corps of Engineers suspending construction on property found to contain
wetlands); Tampa-Hillsborough County v. A.G.W.S., 608 So.2d 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1992) (temporary limitation of landowners' development opportunities caused
by reservation map); Iowa Coal Mining Co. v. Monroe County, 494 N.W.2d 664
(Iowa 1993) (zoning ordinance prohibiting use of strip mining property as solid waste
landfills); Fitzgarrald v. City of Iowa City, 492 N.W.2d 659 (Iowa 1992) (ordinance
preventing construction from penetrating specified zone surrounding municipal airport); Wilson v. Commonwealth, 597 N.E.2d 43 (Mass. 1992) (destruction of property
by natural forces, while administrative procedure preventing construction of revetment
follows its normal, reasonable course); Woodbury Place Partners v. Woodbury, 492
N.W.2d 258 (Minn.App. 1992) (interim development moratorium); Smith v. Town
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Second, by accepting the conclusion that the state had deprived
Lucas "of all economically beneficial use," ' 34 the majority felt justified
in addressing the character of the "harmful or noxious uses" exception"
to the general prohibition against uncompensated total takings. 6 A
finding of anything less than total deprivation would have thrown
Lucas's case into the "ad hoc, factual inquiries" analysis typified by
the Court's opinion in Penn Central TransportationCo. v. New York
City.3 7
Because the majority left undisturbed the state courts' finding of
no value, Scalia felt obligated to explore the extent of the noxious
use exception. 38 According to the Council, the environmental protection goals of the Beachfront Management Act, 39 goals that even Lucas
of Wolfeboro, 615 A.2d 1252 (N.H. 1992) (invalidated planning board's reconfiguration that prevented residential use of lot); Matter of Plan for Orderly Withdrawal,
609 A.2d 1248 (N.J. 1992) (State Insurance Commission requirement that affiliates
of insurer forfeit licenses upon insurer's withdrawal from market); Bernardsville
Quarry v. Bernardsville Borough, 608 A.2d 1377 (N.J. 1992) (ordinance imposing
licensing requirements for quarry operations and limiting the depth to which property
can be quarried). In only two cases have the courts seriously considered the possibility
of a total taking. See Berrios v. City of Lancaster, 798 F. Supp. 1153 (E.D. Pa.
1992) (though condemnation of leased property amounted to total destruction of
plaintiffs' leasehold interest, month-to-month lease did not constitute a distinct
investment-backed expectation sufficient to require compensation); Powers v. Skagit
County, 835 P.2d 230 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (case remanded to determine if total
deprivation occurred).
34. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2899 (1992).
35. Id. at 2897.
36. See id. at 2896-97 (citations omitted): "In the [state supreme] court's view,
these concessions brought petitioner's challenge within a long line of this Court's
cases sustaining against Due Process and Takings Clause challenges the State's use
of its 'police powers' to enjoin a property owner from activities akin to public
nuisances."
37. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895 n.8 (quoting Penn
Central, 438 U.S. at 124):
[Justice Stevens'] analysis errs in its assumption that the landowner whose
deprivation is one step short of complete is not entitled to compensation.
Such an owner might not be able to claim the benefit of our categorical
formulation, but, as we have acknowledged time and again, "the economic
impact of the regulation on the claimant and . . . the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations" are
keenly relevant to takings analysis generally.
38. Perhaps the strongest part of the Lucas decision is Scalia's deconstruction
of the "harm-preventing"/"benefit-conferring" distinction. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at
2897-99.
39. See, e.g., id. at 2896 n.10 (quoting S.C. CODE § 48-39-250 (Supp. 1991)
(quotation marks omitted)):
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conceded were legitimate, 40 excused the drastic diminution in value of
Lucas's two lots; the state supreme court agreed. 4' Scalia was not as
easily convinced.
2.

A Categorical Approach

In his majority opinion, Scalia placed total deprivation cases in
a separate category, distinct from the Penn Central-type weighing of
multiple factors 42 and, despite some similarities, from the "categorical
treatment ' 43 used in physical occupation cases such as Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corp." In what is probably the most
controversial part of his opinion, 4 Scalia cites four cases to support
the explication of what he asserts is an existing category of per se
takings:"6 Agins v. City of Tiburon,47 Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining
& Reclamation Association, Inc. ,48 Keystone, and Nollan. On closer
inspection, however, none of the four directly calls for the categorical
treatment of "no value" takings that is central to the majority's
holding.
The General Assembly finds that:
(1) The beach/dune system along the coast of South Carolina is extremely
important to the people of this State and serves the following functions:
(c) provides habitat for numerous species of plants and animals, several
of which are threatened or endangered. Waters adjacent to the beach/dune
system also provide habitat for many other marine species;
(d) provides a natural health environment for the citizens of South
Carolina to spend leisure time which serves their physical and mental wellbeing.
(2) Beach/dune system vegetation is unique and extremely important to the
vitality and preservation of the system.
(3) Many miles of South Carolina's beaches have been identified as critically
eroding....
40. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 896 (S.C.
1991).
41. Id. at 901.
42. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
43. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893.
44. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
45. See, e.g., Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2909 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (The majority
"takes the opportunity to create a new scheme for regulations that eliminate all
economic value."); Epstein, supra note 12, at 1369 n.4 (citation omitted) ("The
constitutional pedigree of [Scalia's] nuisance test is not always clear.")
46. Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2893-94.
47. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
48. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
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In none of the four cases cited did the Court conclude that the
government had totally deprived the landowner of value. 49 In fact, in
three of the cases-Agins, Hodel, and Keystone-the Court did not
even find that a taking had occurred? 0 Thus, the statements in these
cases concerning total deprivation are dicta.
Also problematic is Scalia's use of the takings formulation first
offered by Justice Powell in Agins: "As we have said on numerous
occasions, the Fifth Amendment is violated when land-use regulation
'does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an
owner economically viable use of his land."' ' Actually, in Lucas, as
in Nollan5 2 Scalia exaggerated the pedigree and expanded the scope

of this two-prong test.

First, the "numerous occasions" on which the Court used the
Agins formulation total but eight, including Powell's Agins opinion

and one dissent. 3 In only one of those cases, Nollan, did the Court
find that a taking had occurred because the "substantially advance"
prong had not been satisfied.14 Second, in Agins, Justice Powell stated
that the two-prong formulation came into play in cases involving

"[t]he application of a general zoning law to particular property.""

In fact, the two cases cited by Powell were landowner challenges to

259.

49. See, e.g. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 499; Agins, 447 U.S. at 262.
50. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 501; Hodel, 452 U.S. at 297; Agins, 447 U.S. at

51. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893-94 (quoting
Agins, 447 U.S. at 260) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added in Lucas).
52. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987)
(quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260): "We have long recognized that land use regulation
does not effect a taking if it 'substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests' and
does not 'den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land."' The period of "long
recognition" was at most nine years, the period between Nollan (1987) and Penn
Central (1978), the case cited in Agins as the source of the "economically viable use"
prong.
53. Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 18 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834; Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470, 485 (1987); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126
(1985); Kirby Forest Industries, Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 14 (1984); Hodel
v. Virginia Surface Min. and Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 295-96 (1981);
San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 628 (1981) (Brennan,
J., dissenting); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
54. Actually, this part of Nollan could be read as dictum (that is, language
that is not necessary for the resolution of the case before the court), for Scalia notes
that, even under the rational basis test insisted upon by the coastal commission, the
condition failed. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. See also Kayden, supra note 16, at
313-14.
55. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260 (emphasis added).
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local government restrictions (use zoning in Nectow v. City of
Cambridge56 and historic preservation in Penn Central"). In Nollan,
Scalia expanded this to cases challenging all "land use regulation"5
by local and state officials, more specifically, a state coastal commission's conditional approval of a landowner's construction plans. By
the time Lucas's challenge reached the Court, Scalia had expanded
the reach of the test to a state-mandated, environmentally based,
beachfront protection scheme. Even as the majority extended the
reach of the two-prong test, however, it held out slight hope for
public officials that even a total deprivation could be justified.
3. Or Is It Non categorical?: The Nuisances-Plus Exception
While Scalia's method in Lucas is categorical in the sense that he
identified a discrete classification for total takings cases,5 9 the other
dictionary definition of categorical ("Being without exception or
qualification; absolute."6°) is not satisfied. The majority concedes that
there is an exception, though arguably a small one, in the "confiscatory regulations" 6l category:
Any limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed
(without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in
the restrictions that the background principles of the State's
law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership. A law or decree with such an effect must, in other words,
do no more than duplicate the result that could have been
achieved in the courts-by adjacent landowners (or other
uniquely affected persons) under the State's law of private
nuisance, or by the State under its complementary power to
62
abate nuisances that affect the public generally, or otherwise.
Stated otherwise,
into effect, there
the property that
public regulation,
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

if, before the challenged public regulation has gone
already exists a valid, common law restriction on
would prohibit the same activities as the challenged
then even a total deprivation would be permissible.

277 U.S. 183 (1928) (cited in Agins, 447 U.S. at 260).
438 U.S. 104 (1978) (cited in Agins, 447 U.S. at 260).
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834.
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893.
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

ed. 1992).
61. Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2900.

62. Id. (footnote omitted).
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Of course, the most intriguing questions posed by Lucas concern
the nature and extent of this exception. The Court tells us that this
"nuisances-plus" exception encompasses private nuisance, public nuisance, and other restrictions, 63 and that "[t]he fact that a particular
use has long been engaged in by similarly situated owners ordinarily
imports a lack of any common law prohibition . . . .. Still, the
Court's conception of these common law restrictions is not static for,
as Scalia notes, "changed circumstances or new knowledge may make
"

what was previously permissible no longer

S0. '' 65

Therefore, two sets

of circumstances remain in which total uncompensated deprivations
will not constitute a taking: (1) situations in which the challenged
public regulation merely restates preexisting common lav principles
(we can call this "redundant regulation") and (2) situations in which
the challenged public regulation is a statutory response to "changed
circumstances or new knowledge" that could have been addressed by
common law devices (we can label this "responsive regulation").
The Court provides an example of each. For redundant regulation, we have "the owner of a lake bed [who] is denied the requisite
permit to engage in landfilling operations that would have the effect
of flooding others' land." As an illustration of responsive regulation,
we have "the corporate owner of a nuclear generating plant, when it
is directed to remove all improvements from its land upon discovery
that the plant sits astride an earthquake fault." 67 As for Lucas himself,
the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the state court that
had not yet engaged in Scalia's categorical treatment (with its exceptions). 68 Unlike the remand in FirstEnglish,69 however, the state court
in Lucas was not given the opportunity to reconsider the total takings
allegation for, as noted above, the five-member majority considered
that key issue as settled.
63. In footnote 16, Scalia gives examples of that other: "litigation absolving
the State (or private parties) of liability for the destruction of 'real and personal
property, in cases of actual necessity, to prevent the spreading of a fire' or to forestall
other grave threats to the lives and property of others." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900
n.16 (quoting Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 18-19 (1880)).
64. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901.
65. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 827, cmt. g (1979)).

66. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 2901-02. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d
484 (S.C. 1992). See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
69. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990)
(on remand, state court found no taking).
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Parcel-as-a-Whole Revisited

The finding of no value, however, did not stop the Lucas Court
from offering dictum on the nature of a total taking. Scalia uses his
seventh footnote70 to remind his reader that the Justices are still not
in accord concerning the "parcel as a whole test" articulated by
Justice Brennan in Penn Central.71 Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent

in that case and in his Keystone dissent challenged the denominator,

in the ratio of post-regulation value over pre-regulation value, used
by the majority of Justices who had concluded that the historic
preservation and coal-mining regulations did not result in total deprivations. Rehnquist was concerned that Penn Central's air rights 72
and the coal companies' "coal in place" and support estate 73 may
have been rendered worthless after the public regulations went into
effect.
70. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7 (citations omitted):
Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our "deprivation of all economically
feasible use" rule is greater than its precision, since the rule does not make
clear the "property interest" against which the loss of value is to be
measured. ... Unsurprisingly, this uncertainty regarding the composition

of the denominator in our "deprivation" fraction has produced inconsistent
pronouncements by the Court....
71. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31
(1978):
"Taking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments
and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been
entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particular governmental action has
effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of the
action and on the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the
parcel as a whole ....

72. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 149 n.13 (citation omitted) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting):
Difficult conceptual and legal problems are posed by a rule that a taking
only occurs where the property owner is denied all reasonable return on his
property. Not only must the Court define "reasonable return" for a variety
of types of property .

. . ,

but the Court must define the particular property

unit that should be examined. For example, in this case, if appellees are
viewed as having restricted Penn Central's use of its "air rights," all return
has been denied.
73. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 517
(1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting): "in this case, enforcement of the Subsidence
Act and its regulations will require petitioners to leave approximately 27 million tons
of coal in place. There is no question that this coal is an identifiable and separable
property interest." See also id. at 519 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting): "I see no reason
for refusing to evaluate the impact of the Subsidence Act on the support estate alone,
for Perrnsylvania has clearly defined it as a separate estate in property."
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The determination of the denominator of the takings fraction,
what Margaret Jane Radin has called "conceptual severance, ' ' 4 is
probably the major battleground for future takings cases as they work
their way through the appellate system of the federal and state courts. 75
The debate over the nature of the property affected by the public
regulation concerns not only total takings cases but also the more
common cases involving less-than-total regulatory takings in which
the courts rely on "ad hoc, factual inquiries." ' 76 Footnote seven is
welcome encouragement to those advocates of private use in pending
and future disputes over public regulation.
B. YEE: NOT A COMPELLING CASE

Rent control has been the target of disgruntled private property
owners for decades 77 and the Takings Clause has often been the legal
weapon of choice. 78 Despite this relentless assault, however, statesanctioned schemes for limiting the rents and other benefits conferred
a number of challenges that have
upon landlords have survived
79
Court.
Supreme
the
reached
Opponents of rent control were not the only interested observers
when the Supreme Court agreed to hear a challenge to Escondido,
California's mobile home rent control ordinance, a public regulation
74. See Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross
Currents in The Jurisprudenceof Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1676 (1988):

[Conceptual severance] consists of delineating a property interest consisting
of just what the government action has removed from the owner, and then
asserting that that particular whole thing has been permanently taken. Thus,
this strategy hypothetically or conceptually "severs" from the whole bundle
of rights just those strands that are interfered with by the regulation, and
then hypothetically or conceptually construes those strands in the aggregate
as a separate whole thing.
75. See infra notes 212-24 and accompanying text.
76. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
77. For a representative collection of cases, see CHARLES M. HAAR AND LANCE
LIEBMAN, PROPERTY AND LAW 389-410 (2d ed. 1985). See also Fisher v. City of
Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260 (1986) (Court rejected landlords' antitrust claims).
78. See, e.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988); Fresh Pond
Shopping Center, Inc. v. Callahan, 464 U.S. 875 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting
from dismissal of appeal for want of substantial federal question); Bowles v.
Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944); Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
79. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 440
(1982) (citations omitted): "This Court has consistently affirmed that States have
broad power to regulate housing conditions in general and the landlord-tenant
relationship in particular without paying compensation for all economic injuries that
such regulation entails."
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that, according to the petitioners, "when viewed against the backdrop
of California's Mobilehome Residency Law, amounts to a physical
occupation of their property entitling them to compensation . . .,,o
Landowners' attorneys and other champions of private use saw Yee
as an opportunity for the Court to signal that its opinion in Loretto
should not be restricted to its facts. In other words, the per se physical
occupation test could be applied in cases of constructive occupation
by the government. The Yees' unsuccessful attack on the City of
Escondido's mobile home rent control scheme was an attempt to
expand the scope of the Court's holding in Loretto, a 1982 case in
which the Court found that an illegal taking by physical occupation
had been effected by cable boxes and cables placed on and inside
8
Loretto's apartment building. '
Our attention is particularly drawn to two elements of the decision. In a majority opinion penned by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor,
the Court refused to accept petitioners' invitations to expand the reach
of Loretto or to evaluate the Yees' challenge under the alternative,
Penn Central-based analysis.
1. Getting Physical
The Yees claimed that the combination of state and local mobile
home regulation placed them in a severe financial bind. A California
law "limit[ing] the bases upon which a park owner may terminate a
mobile home owner's tenancy," 2 coupled with the Escondido ordinance "set[ting] rents back to their 1986 levels, and prohibit[ing] rent
increases without the approval of the City Council," 3 constituted
government-sponsored occupation of the Yees' mobile home pads.
Justice O'Connor summarized the petitioners' arguments and conclusions in the following manner:
Park owners may no longer set rents or decide who their
tenants will be. As a result, . . . any reduction in the rent for
a mobile home pad causes a corresponding increase in the
value of a mobile home, because the mobile home owner now
owns, in addition to a mobile home, the right to occupy a pad
at a rent below the value that would be set by the free market.
Because ... the park owner cannot evict a mobile home
80. Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1526 (1992).
81. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 421-25.

82. Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1526 (citing Mobilehome Residency Law, CAL. CIv.

CODE § 798.56 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991)).

83. Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1527 (citing Escondido Ordinance § 4(g)).
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owner or easily convert the property to other uses, . . . the
value thus represents the right to occupy the pad at belowmarket rent indefinitely. And because the [state law] permits
the mobile home owner to sell the mobile home in place, the
mobile home owner can receive a premium from the purchaser
As a result, ...
corresponding to this increase in value ....
the rent control ordinance has transferred a discrete interest
in land-the right to occupy the land indefinitely at a submarket rent-from the park owner to the mobile home owner.
Petitioners contend that what has been transferred from park
owner to mobile home owner is no less than a right of physical
occupation of the park owner's land. 4
Despite contrary holdings from two federal circuits, 5 the Court
refused to stretch Loretto this far.
The critical element of compulsion was missing in the Yees' case
for, as O'Connor noted, "[tihe government effects a physical taking
only where it requires the landowner to submit to the physical
occupation of his land."8 s6 Because the Yees voluntarily entered the
mobile home pad rental business and because state and local laws did
not force them to stay in business, the Justices could conclude that,
unlike in Loretto, "no government has required any physical invasion
'8 7
of petitioners' property.
With the physical occupation argument removed, the Yees attempted to shift their strategy by alleging that a regulatory taking had
occurred. Although the Court identified some of the factors that
might be appropriate to the "ad hoc, factual inquiries" in a lessthan-total, regulatory takings case,88 prudence dictated that judicial
resolution of those issues would have to await a subsequent court
action.
Reserving the Question Asked Too Late
The Supreme Court was primarily interested in the Yees' case
because of the apparent conflict between the law in California state
2.

84. Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1528 (citation omitted).
85. Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270, 1276 (9th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 940 (1988); Pinewood Estates of Michigan v. Barnegat Township
Leveling Board, 898 F.2d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 1990). See also Seawall Associates v. City
of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1065 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 976 (1989)
(moratorium on demolition or conversion of single room occupancy buildings,
including "rent-up" provisions, amounted to physical occupation).
86. Yee, 112 S.Ct. at 1528.

87. Id.
88. See id. at 1530 (wealth transfer to mobile home owner who sells home,

deprivation of park owner's right to exclude).
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courts and two federal circuits, including the federal circuit that was
responsible for California. The Court agreed to hear arguments on
only two of petitioners' questions.8 9 The takings question referred
specifically to decisions that had attempted to extend Loretto:
Two federal courts of appeal have held that the transfer of a
premium value to a departing mobilehome tenant, representing
the value of the right to occupy at a reduced rate under local
mobilehome rent control ordinances, constitute[s] an impermissible taking. Was it error for the state appellate court to
disregard the rulings and hold that there was no taking under
the fifth and fourteenth amendments? 90
The Court, citing Supreme Court Rule 14.1(a) and the rule's promotion of fairness to the respondent and judicial efficiency, 9' found it
imprudent to entertain any non-Loretto, regulatory takings arguments .92
The rule instructs the Justices to consider "[o]nly the questions
set forth in the petition, or fairly included therein ..... -9 O'Connor's
logic tracks well with the categorical approach used several weeks
later by Justice Scalia in Lucas. She characterized the regulatory
takings issue as "related to ... and perhaps complementary to" the
94
question offered by the Yees but not "fairly included therein."
"Consideration of whether a regulatory taking occurred," O'Connor
reasoned, "would not assist in resolving whether a physical taking
occurred as well; neither of the two questions is subsidiary to the
other. Both might be subsidiary to a question embracing both-Was
there a taking?-but they exist side by side, neither encompassing the
other." 95 Table I is a graphic representation of O'Connor's point.
The Court's refusal to answer the regulatory takings question in
Yee is a two-1art warning to future litigants in cases alleging violations
of the Takings Clause occasioned by public regulation. Those advocating private use are cautioned to cover all of the relevant bases and
to encourage judges to move from one takings category to the other

part).

89. Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 294 (1991) (certiorari granted, in
90. Yee, 112 S.Ct. at 1533 (quoting Petition for Certiorari, at i) (alteration in

original).
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Yee, 112 S.Ct. at 1532-33 (citing Sup. CT. R. 14.1(a)).
Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1533.
Id. at 1532 (quoting Sup. CT. R. 14.1(a)).
Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1533.
Id. (citations omitted).
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TABLE I
A TAKINGS SCHEMATIC

-lQUL^To"V

T

1

T

Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1533 (1992).
See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
c See, e.g., San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621,
A
B

638 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting): "The phrase 'inverse condemnation' generally
describes a cause of action against a government defendant in which a landowner
may recover just compensation for a 'taking' of his property under the Fifth
Amendment, even though formal condemnation proceedings in exercise of the
sovereign's power of eminent domain have not been instituted by a government
entity."
D See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
E See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
(1982).

, See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
r See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
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until the court either finds a violation96 or is convinced that the
government has avoided all of the takings pitfalls 7 The warning to
public sector advocates is more specific. The Yee Court held open the
possibility that, in future cases, the Justices might find wealth-shifting
regulations to be regulatory takings, even if the property owners hurt
by the government restriction were not compelled to engage in regulated conduct. 98 In other words, the Court's deference to public
regulators does have its limits.
C. PFZ: LOCHNER" STAYS BURIED

For a time, the extreme deference granted government officials
regulating the use of land seemed in jeopardy during Takings Term
II.100 By the time the term ended, however, the Court had passed up
96. See, e.g., Richardson v. City and County of Honolulu, 802 F. Supp. 326,
332-38 (D. Haw. 1992) (ordinance imposing ceiling on renegotiated lease rents for
condominium units was not physical occupation taking, but was regulatory taking).
97. See, e.g., Sandpiper Mobile Village v. City of Carpinteria, 12 Cal. Rptr.
2d 623, 625-27 (Ct. App. 1992) (mobile home rent control ordinance neither physical
occupation nor regulatory taking); Manocherian v. Lenox Hill Hospital, 586 N.Y.S.2d
726, 731-34 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (statute requiring landlords to provide renewable leases
neither physical occupation nor regulatory taking).
98. Compare Colony Grove Association v. City of Carson, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d
849, 850-53 (Ct. App. 1992) (complaint alleges facts that could establish that mobile
home rent control ordinance effected regulatory taking) with Southview Associates,
Ltd. v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84, 92-95 (2d Cir. 1992) (no government compulsion for
residential subdivision developer denied land-use permit). See also Presault v. United
States, 27 Cl. Ct. 69, 95 (1992) (applying Penn Centralanalysis to temporary physical
occupation effected by National Trails Act).
99. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
100. The Yees actually hoped to raise two alternative arguments once the physical
occupation theory was rejected: "a denial of substantive due process and a regulatory
taking." As the due process argument was not even raised or addressed below, the
Court dismissed it in passing. Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1531. See Joseph L. Sax, Property
Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1433, 1433-34 (footnote omitted):
The Court granted certiorari on several potentially far-reaching issues,
among them whether the ordinance denied the landowner substantive due
process. Had Yee prevailed on that ground, it would have portended greatly
increased judicial involvement in property cases, opening an opportunity for
courts to overturn legislative judgments in ways that have not been seen
since the era of Lochner v. New York.
As Professor Sax notes, id. at 1434 n.7, Justice Stevens, in his Lucas dissent, accused
the majority of "denying the legislature much of its traditional power to revise the
law governing the rights and uses of property," thus turning the clock back to the
Lochner era. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2921 (1992)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the opportunity to climb back up the slippery slope of substantive
due process in order to protect private use even more strongly.
In PFZ, a developer's three-part challenge' 0 was whittled down
to one issue by the Court: the allegation that the refusal of the
Regulations and Permits Authority of the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico (ARPE) to process PFZ's construction drawings for a hotel and
residential development project violated PFZ's rights to substantive
due process. 02 Following oral argument, however, the Justices chose
not to second-guess local regulators, 10 3 adhering instead to the Euclidean deference to which we have grown so accustomed in the land-use
field104
Two aspects of PFZ are most noteworthy: first, the presentation
of, and reaction to, PFZ's assertion of a constitutionally protected
right to use real property; and second, the abruptness with which the
Court rejected a landowner's invitation to depart from decades of
deference and restraint in the area of private use regulation.
1. An Appealing Argument-At First
To attract the attention of the United States Supreme Court is
no mean feat, especially now, as the Rehnquist Court has moved to
101. The federal district court dismissed PFZ's procedural due process, substantive due process, and equal protection claims. PFZ dropped its takings claim in its
amended complaint. PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 928 F.2d 28, 30 and n.2 (1st
Cir.), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 414 (1991), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted,
112 S. Ct. 1151 (1992).
102. See Brief of Petitioner at i, PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 112 S. Ct.
1151 (1992) (No. 91-122): "Whether an arbitrary, capricious or illegal denial of a
construction permit to a developer by officials acting under color of state law can
state a substantive due process claim."
103. PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 112 S. Ct. 1151 (1992) (certiorari
dismissed as improvidently granted).
104. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926):
If these reasons [supporting Euclid's zoning scheme] . . . do not demonstrate the wisdom or sound policy in all respects of those restrictions which
we have indicated as pertinent to the inquiry, at least, the reasons are
sufficiently cogent to preclude us from saying, as it must be said before the
ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, that such provisions are clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare.
See also DONALD G. HAGMAN & JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW § 10.2, at 297 (2d ed. 1986) (footnote
omitted): "[Euclid] was the Supreme Court's first chance to apply substantive due
process to a land use regulatory scheme.... The four-fold diminution in the
landowner's property value was simply the avoidable consequence of the police power
function. Regrettable, perhaps, but not actionable. Euclid, quite simply, opened the
doors to everything land use control law is today."
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reduce the Justices' caseload. 105 In its Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
PFZ depicted a tale of frustration and betrayal at the hands of inept
and malicious planning officials.'06
The tale of woe began in May of 1976 with the planning board's
adoption of "a resolution approving a development project" followed
by an unsuccessful challenge carried to the Supreme Court of Puerto
Rico in 1978, ARPE approval of plans for the first phase of the
project and PFZ's submission of construction drawings in 1981, six
years of official inaction by ARPE during which time PFZ alleges
that ARPE officials and the governor obstructed progress on the
development, culminating in PFZ's filing of an original complaint in
federal district court in December of 1987.107 Eight months later,
ARPE notified PFZ that the developer "would not receive a construction permit, because its project had ceased to have effect," a decision
that PFZ unsuccessfully attempted to have the courts of Puerto Rico
review. 0 8 PFZ's amended complaint followed in October 1988; it was
dismissed by the district court and the First Circuit affirmed the
dismissal. 1' 9
Although allegations of government caprice and arbitrariness are
serious, they are by no means unfamiliar to the Court for, on several
recent occasions, the Justices have allowed similar claims to die in the
lower courts." 0 Most likely, the Court's attention was caught by
PFZ's allegation that the First Circuit was out of step with the
majority of federal circuit courts that had addressed the question of
whether a developer's substantive due process rights are violated by
the arbitrary and capricious denial of a permit."'
105. See, e.g., The Fading Court, EcONOMIST, May 1, 1993, at 62: "The court
heard only 72 cases in the term that has just ended, compared with twice that number
a decade ago."
106. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit at 3-6, PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 112 S. Ct. 1151 (1992)
(No. 91-122).
107. Id. at 3-5.
108. Id. at 5-6.
109. Id. at 6. See PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 739 F. Supp. 67 (D. P.R.
1990), aff'd, 928 F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1991).
110. See, e.g., Commercial Builders of N. Cal. v. Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872
(9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1997 (1992); Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 851 (1988); Chongris v. Board of Appeals, 811 F.2d
36 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1021 (1987); Creative Environments v. Estabrook,
680 F.2d 822 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 989 (1982); Guinnane v. San Francisco
City Planning Comm'n, 257 Cal. Rptr. 2d 742 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
936 (1989); Archview Invs., Inc. v. City of Collinsville, 584 N.E.2d 821 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 412 (1992); Hyslip v. Sloan, 508 N.Y.S.2d 732
(App. Div. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 914 (1987).
111. See Petition for Certiorari at 12, PFZ, 112 S. Ct. 1151 (1992) (No. 91-122):
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PFZ asserted that courts in at least eight other circuits had
"reached an opposite conclusion from the First Circuit."" ' 2 PFZ
maintained that the maverick court had held "that rejections of
development projects and refusals to issue building permits, even if
malicious, in bad faith and for invalid or illegal reasons, cannot
implicate substantive due process, unless the improper motivation is
accompanied by the deprivation of another specific constitutional
right."" 3 While PFZ's characterization of the First Circuit's hard-line
position is subject to debate," 4 the Court seized the opportunity, at
least temporarily, to resolve the apparent split among the circuits and
to provide some guidance for litigants confused by the relationship
between regulatory takings and due process violations." 5
The Court's decision to hear arguments only on "[w]hether an
arbitrary, capricious or illegal denial of a construction permit to a
developer by officials acting under color of state law can state a
substantive due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983"1l6 posed
strategic difficulties for PFZ. Without a procedural due process claim
in reserve, PFZ's attorneys devoted a good deal of their argument to
the articulation and defense of a landowner's constitutionally protected "Right to Devote Private Property to a Legitimate Use."" 7
"THE PETITION SHOULD BE GRANTED TO RESOLVE THE SPLIT OF
AUTHORITY IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS DENIAL OF A CONSTRUCTION PERMIT
TO A DEVELOPER CAN EVER CONSTITUTE A SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS VIOLATION."
112. Id.
113. Id. (citing Chiplin Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Lebanon, 712 F.2d 1524,
1528 (1st Cir. 1983).
114. First, the judges of the First Circuit are not as callous as PFZ would have
the Court believe, as they foreclose substantive due process relief only when adequate
state remedies exist. See Chiplin Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Lebanon, 712 F.2d 1524,
1528 (1st Cir. 1983): "A mere bad faith refusal to follow state law in such local
administrative matters simply does not amount to a deprivation of due process where
the state courts are available to correct the error." Second, even the renegade circuit
acknowledges that planning conflicts that are "tainted with fundamental procedural
irregularity, racial animus, or the like" do not fit the description of the "run of the
mill dispute between a developer and a town planning agency" that would not
engender substantive a due process violation. Creative Environments, Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822, 833 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 989 (1982) (emphasis
added).
115. See Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211, 1214 (6th Cir. 1992):
"Our research . . . reveals the circuits to be deeply divided concerning the theories
to be employed in federal court cases challenging zoning."
116. Petition for Certiorari at i, PFZ, 112 S. Ct. 1151 (1992) (No. 91-122); PFZ
Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 112 S.Ct. 414 (1991).
117. Brief for Petitioner at 14, PFZ, 112 S.Ct. 1151 (1992) (No. 91-122).
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In the summary of their argument, PFZ's attorneys alleged that
the First Circuit "ignored this Court's recognition that the legitimate
use of private property is a protected constitutional right."" 8 Later
in its brief, PFZ identified the chief source of that claimed right to
be the Supreme Court's holding in State of Washington, ex rel. Seattle
Title Trust Co. v. Roberge:"9
The rights protected by substantive due process are not
limited solely to fundamental rights. The Due Process Clause
protects against the deprivation of other rights implicating
"life, liberty, or property," as well. Thus, within the context
of substantive due process, this Court has expressly recognized
that the right of a landowner "to devote its land to any
legitimate use is property [sic] within the protection of the
1 20
Constitution."
Actually, the quotation should read "properly within the protection of the Constitution." 2 Though slight and understandable, PFZ's
error is not benign, however, for it might give the reader the impression that this "right" is more directly tied to the Fourteenth Amendment's "life, liberty, and property" formulation than intended by the
Roberge Court. PFZ did not allege that this right was a fundamental
one that warranted the Court's strict scrutiny but that it was an
otherwise constitutionally protected right "implicating 'life, liberty,
or property." ' 2 2 The mistake in the quotation strengthens PFZ's
position that property is "implicated" and, thus, that substantive
court review, focused on the legitimacy of ARPE's actions and not
1 23
the fairness of the process, would be in order.
During oral argument, PFZ's attorney repeated the misquotation
when asked by one of the Justices, "Is the question open in this
Court as to whether there is a property right under Puerto Rican law
in the construction permit, or do we have to-is the only issue before
118. Id. at 10.
119. 278 U.S. 116 (1928).
120. Brief for Petitioner at 14, PFZ, 112 S. Ct. 1151 (1992) (No. 91-122) (quoting

Roberge, 278 U.S. at 121).
121. Roberge, 278 U.S. at 121 (emphasis added).

122. Brief for Petitioner at 14, PFZ, 112 S.Ct. 1151 (1992) (No. 91-122).

123. By cloaking that right in something even suggestive of fundamentality, PFZ
seemed to be inviting the Justices to engage in the kind of means-end scrutiny that
we identify with Lochner and the activism of the Court's conservative bloc in the
1920s and early 1930s. See, e.g., 2 MELVIN I. UROFSKY, A MARCH OF LIBERTY: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

616-32 (1988).
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us if there is a property right, was it taken?"' 2 4 Counsel's response
compounds the error in the brief: "I think the only issue is . . . if
there was a property right, was it taken. This Court has said in
[Roberge] that the right to devote one's land to a legitimate use is
property within the protection of the Constitution." 1 25
This exchange typifies the difficulties that the attorneys and the
Court had in separating the procedural from the substantive due
process claims. 126 As the oral argument proceeded, the reasoning
became even more convoluted, as Justice O'Connor observed, "It
sounds like you're trying to make a takings claim dressed up as a due
process claim.'

1

27

Counsel's attempts to clarify that this was a due

process "deprivation" claim and not a Fifth Amendment taking were
swallowed up in the confusion. 128 Forced to address the procedural/
substantive distinction in the context of ARPE's delays in processing
PFZ's development permit, petitioner's counsel never even discussed
the question of the alleged singularity of the First Circuit's position.
Respondent's counsel, whose oral argument proceeded without
nearly as much interruption by the Justices, stated in summary of her
argument that "if we don't have a fundamental interest and if he
[PFZ] doesn't have a liberty interest under the due process clause,
then I don't know what he has unless it is a claim that there has been
124. Official Transcript Proceedings Before the Supreme Court of the United
States at 12, PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 112 S. Ct. 1151 (1992) (No. 91-122).
125. Id. at 12 (emphasis added). See also Reply Brief of Petitioner at 9, PFZ
Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 112 S. Ct. 1151 (1992) (No. 91-122) (misquotation
repeated); Motion of the National Association of Home Builders For Leave to File
an Amicus Curiae Brief and Brief in Support of Petitioner at 2, PFZ Properties, Inc.
v. Rodriguez, 112 S. Ct. 1151 (1992) (No. 91-122) (same misquotation); Petition for
Rehearing of PFZ Properties, Inc., PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 112 S. Ct.
1151 (1992) (No. 91-122), available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs File (Apr. 3,
1992) (misquotation repeated).
126. See Brief for Petitioner at 11, PFZ, 112 S. Ct. 1151 (1992) (No. 91-122)
(citation and footnote omitted): "the Due Process Clause encompasses a guarantee
of fair procedure. Thus, a § 1983 action may be brought to remedy a deprivation of
life, liberty or property which occurs in violation of procedural due process. Such
claims are evaluated on the basis of what process the state provides, and whether
that process is itself constitutionally adequate." In the footnote to this passage, PFZ
notes, "The Court did not grant certiorari with respect to PFZ's procedural due
process claims; this discussion is solely for purposes of completeness." Id. at 11
n.14. When one reviews PFZ's versions of the facts, one should not be surprised that
some of the Justices suspected that this was nothing more than a procedural due
process dispute.
127. Official Transcript Proceedings at 19, PFZ, 112 S. Ct. 1151 (1992) (No.
91-122).
128. Id. at 19-20.
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a wrongful adjudication of his claim, which sounds to me like
procedural due process."'' 29 Perhaps the Court agreed, because only

twelve days later the Justices retracted their decision to hear PFZ's
petition. 130

2.

The Confusion Continues
PFZ's claim was not the only opportunity presented to the Court

during the 1991 October Term to address the complexities of substan-

tive due process in a "nonfundamental right" setting. On November

5, 1991, merely one week before PFZ's petition for certiorari was

granted, the Justices heard oral argument in Collins v. City of Harker
Heights. 3 ' The resolution of that dispute provides some clues con2
cerning the Court's abrupt about-face in PFZ.1
Like PFZ, Collins, whose husband (a municipal sanitation worker)
had "died of asphyxia after entering a manhole to unstop a sewer
line,"' 33 sought the Court's recognition that the public defendant had

violated substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, the petitioner sought to convince the court "that
the governmental employer's duty to provide its employees with a
safe working environment is a substantive component of the Due
34
Process Clause."'1
The oral argument, held early in the Court's term, revealed the
Justices' unwillingness to expand the constitutional basis for reviewing
alleged abuses of government power. One Justice acknowledged that

"our problem, [is] obviously, a reluctance to have an undifferentiated,
13
broad-based substantive due process right under [section] 1983.1' 1
Not surprisingly, on February 26, 1992, the same day as oral argument
in PFZ, a unanimous Court joined in Justice Stevens's opinion

129. Id. at 39.
130. PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 112 S. Ct. 1151 (1992).
131. Official Transcript Proceedings Before the Supreme Court of the United
States, Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 112 S. Ct. 1061 (1992) (No. 90-1279).
132. Others, too, have noted the link between Collins and PFZ. See, e.g., Robert

H. Freilich, Laurie L. Vaskov & Frederick Ernst, 1991-92 Supreme Court Review:*
The Court's New Path-The Middle Ground, 24 URB. LAW. 669, 710-11 (1992).

133. Collins, 112 S. Ct. at 1064.
134. Id. at 1069.

135. Official Transcript Proceedings at 16, PFZ, 112 S. Ct. 1151 (1992) (No.
91-122). See also id. at 22-23: "QUESTION: Substantive due process is wonderful.
It really-it-everything turns into a constitutional thing." Later, in response to
respondent's counsel's assertion that "[s]ubstantive due process takes its position
from context," Justice Scalia commented, "I guess I don't understand substantive
due process at all." Id. at 44.
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rejecting the constitutionally protected interest proffered by Collins.
The words used by the Court in refusing Collins's invitation to
intervene did not bode well for PFZ's case:
As a general matter, the Court has always been reluctant to
expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area
are scarce and open-ended. Regents of University of Michigan
v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225-226 (1985). The doctrine of
judicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the utmost care
13 6
whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.
Despite some egregious facts, deference was still in order for, as
Stevens pointed out, the Court's "refusal to characterize the city's
alleged omission in this case as arbitrary in a constitutional sense rests
on the presumption that the administration of Government programs
is based on a rational decisionmaking process that takes account of
competing social political, and economic forces."' 37
Neither Collins nor PFZ will end the confusion over the nature
and extent of substantive due process protections afforded by the
Constitution as interpreted by the federal courts. A recent case from
the Sixth Circuit skillfully addresses the often bewildering state of the
law in the land-use regulatory area. In Pearson v. City of Grand
Blanc,' a Section 1983 lawsuit "stemming from the routine denial
of a zoning change," the court affirmed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment but corrected the district court's conclusion "that
all federal zoning cases should be treated as takings."13 9 The appellate
court's careful attempt to "collate the law on this subject [and]
catalogue the various approaches" in federal courts serves as an
important contribution to the judicial discourse on the regulation of
private use and as hard evidence that this is a troubling area of the
law that is likely to catch the Court's attention in a future dispute.
136. Collins, 112 S. Ct. at 1068. Ironically, Ewing was the case cited by PFZ's
counsel in oral argument as the "clearest authority from this Court that supports

[its] position." Official Transcript Proceedings at 22, PFZ (No. 91-122).
137. Collins, 112 S. Ct. at 1070 (citation omitted).
138. 961 F.2d 1211 (6th Cir. 1992), aff'g, 756 F. Supp. 314 (E.D. Mich. 1991).

PFZ's attorneys employed the then-recent opinion in Pearson to support its unsuccessful attempt to have the Supreme Court reconsider its decision not to render an
opinion. See Petition for Rehearing of PFZ Properties, Inc., PFZ Properties, Inc. v.
Rodriguez, 112 S. Ct. 1151 (April 3, 1992) (No. 91-122), available in LEXIS, Genfed
Library, Briefs File. See also PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 112 S.Ct. 2001
(1992) (rehearing denied).
139. Pearson, 961 F.2d at 1213-14.
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Current and future litigants would benefit from familiarizing
themselves with the Pearson court's six varieties of "federal zoning
claims" 40 : Just Compensation Takings, Due Process Takings, Arbitrary and Capricious Substantive Due Process, Equal Protection,
Procedural Due Process, and First Amendment.14 ' Because, as in
PFZ, the disgruntled landowner was alleging a substantive due process
violation owing to the government's arbitrary and capricious actions, 42 the Pearson court devotes special attention to that category
by sampling analyses and approaches from the various federal circuits. 43 This review confirms, as PFZ's counsel alleged in its original
certiorari petition, that the lower federal courts are divided when it
comes to determining the circumstances that would give rise to a
substantive due process violation when the fairness of the procedures
are not directly at issue.'"
As long as this split between circuits remains, as long as dissatisfied property owners bring their claims of arbitrary and capricious
treatment to the federal courts, and as long as the temptation remains
for Supreme Court Justices to invigorate efforts to protect private use
by simply reciting language from some of the Court's classic land-use
cases, 145 counsel will continue to raise substantive due process concerns
in petitions for certiorari. Because there is little indication that any
of these three contingencies will evaporate, we can look forward to a
renewal of this debate in a future Supreme Court case.

140. Id. at 1215-16.
141. Id. at 1216. Although we might quibble with this list (for example, courts'
dissimilar treatments of free speech and religion cases might necessitate either new
categories or, perhaps, subcategories), reviewing the Sixth Circuit's compendium is
still a very good start.
142. Id. at 1217.
143. Id. at 1217-19.
144. See id. at 1220 (footnote omitted): "The Supreme Court in recent years
has at least thrice reaffirmed a general right of substantive due process, stating that
'the Due Process Clause contains a substantive component that bars certain arbitrary,
wrongful government actions "regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to
implement them." ' " In the omitted footnote, the court cited Zinernon v. Burch,
494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)),
and Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 223-26 (1985). Pearson,
961 F.2d at 1220 n.47.
145. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834-35
(1987) (citing Agins, Penn Central, and Euclid to support substantial nexus test). But
see Nollan, 483 U.S. at 842 (Brennan; J., dissenting): "the court imposes a standard
of precision for the exercise of a State's police power that has been discredited for
the better part of this century."
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TAKINGS LAW IN FLUX: PLOTTING JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR

We would be rash to consider the latest Supreme Court takings
offerings in a vacuum. Indeed, in the largely "ad hoc" world of
takings, context is everything. Decisiohs in new cases depend not only
on facts and circumstances but also on how the new takings jurisprudence builds on and relates to the old.
Each of the three cases we have studied so far, for example, can
be linked with Supreme Court precursors. Lucas, in its invocation of
nuisance law, recalls such classic cases as Mugler v. Kansas,'46 Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 147 and Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Company. 14 1 In Yee, the Court refused to distinguish or overrule
precedents that had insulated rent control from constitutional
challenge 49 and that had narrowly defined the category of per se
takings effected through physical occupation. 50 The Court's reconsideration of its decision to resolve PFZ's substantive due process claim
evokes memories of the "procedural tango" danced by the Justices
during the early and mid-1980s when, in four consecutive cases, the
Court found reasons not to confront the takings question head on.' 5 '
We can establish even more direct ties from the questions left
unanswered in the 1993 cases to the decisions making up the trilogy
in Takings Term I. Justice Scalia's concerns in Lucas over the parcelas-a-whole test 5 2 are largely a response to the tension embodied in
the contrasting calculations provided in Stevens' and Rehnquist's
146. 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887) (destruction of public nuisance not a taking).
147. 237 U.S. 171, 176 (1915) (within city's police power to declare livery stable

nuisance in fact).
148. 272 U.S. 365, 387-88 (1926) ("the law of nuisances ... may be consulted
...for the helpful aid of its analogies in the process of ascertaining the scope of,
the [police] power").

149. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
150. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
151. See HAAR & WOLF, supra note 10, at 902 (footnote omitted):
From 1980 to 1986, in a series of four cases that made their way ultimately
to a decision by the Supreme Court, the Justices disappointed an evergrowing audience of practitioners, jurists, and academics awaiting a definitive answer to the regulatory takings puzzle-that is, whether and when
governmental regulation can amount to a taking that requires compensation
under the fifth amendment.
See also Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); San Diego Gas & Electric

Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Williamson County Regional Planning

Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates
v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986).
152. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
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opinions in Keystone. 5 3 The question of whether mobile home rent
control regulations can effect a temporary regulatory taking would
have been resolved in accordance with First English, 5 4 which is the
case that put an end to the procedural tango. PFZ's efforts to direct
the Court's attention to the nexus between means and ends mirror
Justice Scalia's incantation of the "substantially advance" formula
that dates back to the days of Euclid.'55 These are the ways that
today's law of takings builds incrementally on the shifting foundation
of the past.
Counsel representing public and private sector actors in disputes
concerning land-use and environmental regulation, or those hoping to
head off such disputes, are understandably confused by what appears
to be a cacophony of judicial voices. Attempts to reconcile conflicting
holdings are often unsatisfying as, for example, in the Keystone
majority's efforts to distinguish Justice Holmes's chestnuts in Pennsylvania Coal.5 6 The ad hoc approach validated in Penn Central
makes a lot of sense given the wide variety of regulations affecting
property; the special attachment Americans feel for private property,
a devotion that even has mythic proportions;' and the range of
emergencies, real' and perceived, 5 9 that often prompt costly local,
state, and federal responses.
Unless, and until, the Court broadens its categorical methodology
in the takings area, it would make little sense here, in an article that
treats case law as the advocate's tool, to prescribe a unifying theory
153. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
See also supra note 73.
154. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
155. See supra notes 54 and 145 and accompanying text.
156. See Keystone Bituminous Coai Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 48489 (1987).
157. See, e.g., Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326, 2335 (1992): "Petitioner
and amici argue with some appeal that Article XIIIA frustrates the 'American dream'
of home ownership for many younger and poorer California families."
158. See, e.g., Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16 (1880) (destroying buildings to
prevent spread of fire).
159. See, e.g., Dep't of Agric. and Consumer Servs. v. Mid-Florida Growers,
Inc., 521 So.2d 101, 105-06 (Fla. 1988) (McDonald, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 870 (1988):
The conduct of the department should be reviewed in the light of the
perceived emergency confronting the department when the canker was found.
In hindsight, it may be that the department overreacted and confiscated
property not needed, but a review of the department's actions should not
be made on hindsight.
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for takings effected by regulation and, thereby, to engage in further
hairsplitting. It makes much more sense to attempt to take a descriptive approach as we strive to understand the actual behavior of judges
who are charged with reconciling private use and public regulation in
concrete settings.
Table II serves this descriptive function as it simply illustrates
the two key factors that contend for the decision-maker's notice in
regulatory takings cases: the level of public harm as perceived at the
time the challenged regulation goes into effect and the degree of
diminution in value of the discrete segment of private property
negatively affected by the challenged regulation. 60 The first variable,
"Danger to public health, safety, morals," is represented by the
vertical axis and identified with Justice Brandeis's dissenting opinion
in Pennsylvania Coal,'6' the landmark (if not seminal' 62) Supreme
Court regulatory takings case. The second variable, "Property rights
retained," is represented by the horizontal axis and identified with
Justice Holmes's opinion for the Pennsylvania Coal majority. 61

160. As the text following this note indicates, the variables represented on the
chart track with the sentiments of majority and dissenting opinions in Pennsylvania
Coal. For those less historically inclined, the table also tracks well with the Penn
CentralCourt's "factors that have particular significance." See Penn Central Transp.
Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted):
The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly,

the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment
backed expectations are of course relevant considerations. So too is the
character of the government action. A "taking" may more readily be found
when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical
invasion by Government than when interference arises from some public
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the
public good.
Note, however, that Table II, because it reflects judicial behavior in regulatory
takings cases, is inappropriate for disputes involving "physical invasion by Government," for the Court has assigned those cases to a separate takings category. See
supra Table I.
161. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
162. See, e.g., Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135 (1921) (allegation that rent control
amounted to taking).
163. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. 393 at 412.
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Justice Holmes. for the Court in Pennsylvania Coal:
"[Tihe general rule at least is, that while property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking . . .
[T]his is not a question of degree -- and therefore
.
cannot be disposed of by general propositions ..

Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Pennsylvania Coal:
imposed to protect the public health,
"[Restriction
safety or morals from dangers threatened is not a
taking....
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Property rights retained (Holmes)
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TAKING

Although Table II is straightforward, the determination of whether
or not a dispute falls within the striped ("TAKING") area depends,
of course, on the numerical value assigned to each variable. The
likelihood that the court will find a taking increases as one moves
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down either scale. As the level of perceived public harm increases,
only a concomitantly greater private use deprivation (reducing the
numerical value on the horizontal axis) will lead the court to a
conclusion that a taking has occurred.' 64 If the court believes that the
diminution in private property value is relatively slight, even the
slightest public need will permit the regulation to survive the regulatory
deprivation. 16 As long as judges continue to adhere to the calculus
represented by Table II, there is no control, other than the votes of
other judges, that would prevent a decision-maker from either inflating the value assigned to a perceived public danger (in order to
rationalize a compensation-free regulation) or from' too narrowly
confining the "parcel as a whole" to a discrete segment (in order to
justify a finding of a constitutional violation). In these ways, the
table, though eminently unhelpful in instructing a court how best to
act in theory is, nonetheless, an accurate depiction of judicial behavior
in fact. 166
As the Justices' opinions in Lucas and Yee indicate, the state of
takings law is complicated and in flux. Each year brings dozens of
reported appellate opinions from federal and state courts in which
judges are asked to determine whether a regulation has effected a
violation of the federal or state takings provisions. Such a decisional
torrent in a relatively noncontroversial and settled area of law is hard
enough for a practitioner to maneuver through and manage. When
the area is as evidently unstable and mutable as takings law, advocates
have an even greater need for guidance.
Such guidance, unfortunately, is typically found in judicial aphorisms such as Pennsylvania Coal's "too far" formulation167 or the
familiar platitude from Armstrong v. United States:161 "[the] Fifth
164. In Keystone, for example, the majority found that the Subsidence Act

responded to more urgent needs than the Kohler Act that was struck down sixty
years before. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,
487-88 (1987): "With regard to the Kohler Act, the Court believed that the Commonwealth had acted only to ensure against damage to some private landowners'
homes ....
Here, by contrast, the Commonwealth is acting to protect the public
interest in health, the environment, and the fiscal integrity of the area."
165. Courts, for example, have recognized that zoning can be employed for a
wide range of purposes. See HAGMAN & JUERGENsMEYER, supra note 104, §§ 3.14.22 ("Purposes of Zoning").
166. The majority and dissenting opinions in Penn Central and Keystone are
good examples of how different judges can assign dramatically different weight to
the same variables. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
167. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
16g. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
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Amendment's guarantee [is] ... designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, ' in69 all fairness
and justice, should beborne by the public as a whole.'
Perhaps the most helpful takings formula is the bipartite test
included by Justice Powell in the Court's opinion in Agins. 70 Table
III, which plots classic and recent takings cases along the lines of the
Agins test, enables us to identify some of the problem areas that
remain in the wake of Takings Term II.
The Agins formula has been applied by the courts to cases in
which the landowner has alleged a regulatory taking through total or
less-than-total deprivation. 7 ' As discussed previously, 7 2 Powell noted
that the Court had found a taking when the challenged regulation
"does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an
owner economically viable use of his land.' ' 7 3 Thus, in Table III,
three of the four boxes in the matrix include cases in which courts
74
have determined that a Fifth Amendment violation may have occurred
for, in order to win a takings challenge, the opponents of the
regulation only need to demonstrate that one of Powell's conditions
has been satisfied.
Most of the cases included in Table III-Nollan, Penn Central,
Agins, Keystone, Pennsylvania Coal, First English, and Lucas-are
Supreme Court decisions whose names and holdings are, by now,
familiar to the reader. In the five cases located in the upper right
box, the Court found that neither condition was satisfied. Therefore,
the landmark preservation ordinance (Penn Central), open-space plan
(Agins), and state Subsidence Act (Keystone) survived challenges
brought by private users who failed to demonstrate that no economically viable use remained in their property.
Other Supreme Court cases fall into one of the three takings
boxes. In Nollan, the Court concluded that "the permit condition
[did not] serve[] the same [legitimate] governmental purpose as the
development ban.' ' 75 In contrast to Nollan, the Court in Pennsylvania
169. Id. at 49.
170. See supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
171. For the various taking categories, see supra Table I.
172. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
173. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (footnote omitted).
174. In some of the cases included in the table, the court remanded the case to
the lower courts for trial, at which time a takings determination would be made. See,
e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 322 (1987).
175. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
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Coal, First English, and Lucas did not base its holding on the nexus
between the challenged regulation and legitimate state interests but
relied instead on the allegation that the challenged regulations-the
subsidence mining act (PennsylvaniaCoal), the interim flood protection ordinance (FirstEnglish), and the Beachfront Management Act
(Lucas)-left the landowners with no economically viable use. 76
As we focus on the remaining entries in Table III, selected recent
decisions by state and lower federal courts that used the Agins
formulation, we can get a fuller flavor of the range of cases implicating the Takings Clause. Upon remand by the Supreme Court, the
California appeals court in FirstEnglish determined that neither prong
of the Agins takings test had been satisfied because "[Ordinance
11,855] did not deny First English 'all use' of the property and the
uses it did deny could be constitutionally prohibited under the County's power to protect public safety."' 77 Thus, once all the facts had
been presented, the appellate court's holding was not unlike that of
the other cases in Table III's "nontaking" box.
A second state court post-Takings Term I case resulted in a
contrary decision for the challenged regulator. In Seawall Associates
v. City of New York,' the New York Court of Appeals found three
reasons why Local Law No. 9, an ordinance "prohibit[ing] the
demolition, alteration, or conversion of single-room occupancy (SRO)
properties and obligat[ing] the owners to restore all units to habitable
condition and lease them at controlled rents for an indefinite period,"
effected a taking. 79 First, the court agreed with the plaintiffs that the
ordinance "has resulted in a physical occupation of their properties

176. In Pennsylvania Coal, Justice Holmes found that "[a]s applied to this case
the statute is admitted to destroy previously existing rights of property and contract."
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (emphasis added). In
First English; the Court "assume[d] that the Los Angeles County ordinance[s] halve]
denied appellant all use of its property for a considerable period of years . ..."

First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304, 322 (1987) (emphasis added). In Lucas, the Court accepted the trial
court's finding that "Lucas's two beachfront lots [were] rendered valueless by
respondent's enforcement of the coastal-zone construction ban." Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 2896 (1992) (emphasis added).
177. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 902 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct.
866 (1990).
178. 542 N.E.2d 1059 (N.Y. 1989).
179. Id. at 1060-61.
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and is, therefore, a per se compensable taking."' 8 0 Second, the court
found "inescapable" the conclusion "that the effect of the provisions
is unconstitutionally to deprive owners of economically viable use of

their properties."' 8 ' Finally, the necessary ends-means connection was
lacking, as "the nexus between the obligations placed on SRO property owners and the alleviation of the highly complex social problem
of homelessness is indirect at best and conjectural."'8 2 Assuming that
the majority's analysis is accurate,' 3 as a "three-time loser," Seawall
has certainly earned its place in the lower right position in Table III.
85
The five remaining cases-Loveladies Harbor,'84Florida Rock,"

Whitney Benefits,'16 Formanek,8 7 and Tabb Lakes,'-originated in

the United States Claims Court, now known as the United States
Court of Federal Claims.8 9 The plaintiffs sought compensation under
the Tucker Act'90 for federal environmental activities that allegedly
violated Fifth Amendment takings strictures. 9 In four of these five

cases, landowners sought compensation for alleged regulatory takings
attributable to the activities of the United States Army Corps of

Engineers (Corps) in administering the wetlands dredge and fill pro180. Id. at 1062 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458
U.S. 419, 427 (1982)). Although the Court in Yee provided a narrow reading of
Loretto, see supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text, the Seawall court's condemnation of "the forced occupation by strangers under the rent-up provisions of the
law" arguably fits within Loretto's categorical approach. Seawall, 542 N.E.2d at
1065.
181. Seawall, 542 N.E.2d at 1068.
182. .d. at 1069. In a piercing dissent, Judge Bellacosa cautioned his colleagues
that, "[llike the economic theories underlying Lochner we, as Judges, should not
inquire into the wisdom or wholesomeness of SRO's as shelter for potentially 52,000
new, displaced homeless persons-that policy choice belongs to the elected officials
who enacted the law." Seawall, 542 N.E.2d at 1072 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
183. The majority's conclusion that the restrictions in Local Law No. 9 "deny
the owners 'economically viable use' of their properties" is somewhat problematic
after Lucas. Seawall, 542 N.E.2d at 1066.
184. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990).
185. Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990).
186. Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 20 Cl. Ct. 324 (1990), aff'd, 926
F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 406 (1991).
187. Formanek v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 332 (1992).
188. Tabb Lakes, Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 1334 (1992).
189. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 171(a) (West Supp. 1993).
190. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1491 (West Supp. 1993).
191. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1491(a)(1) (West 1986 & Supp. 1993): "The United States
Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim
against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, ...
express or implied contract with the United States . .. ."

or upon any
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gram under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act. 192 In the fifth case,
Whitney Benefits, the plaintiff mining company demonstrated that
the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA) effected
a taking of its mineral estate.193
As the cases in the table suggest, the Claims Court has become
a laboratory of federal environmental takings law. 94 While state and
federal supreme courts have devoted hundreds of pages to working
out the intricacies of takings theory, Claims Court judges, moving
cases through the summary judgment'95 and ripeness' 96 stages, have
wrestled with assignment of liability and, ultimately, assessment of
damages. For example, the government was found accountable for
the following sums (not including interest, which could be quite
substantial): 97 $2,658,000 for the ninety-nine percent diminution in
9 $1,029,000 for the ninety-five percent
'
value in Loveladies Harbor,1
diminution in Florida Rock,'" $60,296,000 for the total diminution
in Whitney Benefits,20° and $933,921 for the eighty-eight percent
diminution in Formanek.20'
The holdings in Whitney Benefits and Tabb Lakes are quite
consistent with the Supreme Court decisions occupying the same boxes
in Table III. Because the deprivation occasioned by SMCRA was
absolute, Whitney's condition was not unlike that of the20 2successful
plaintiffs in Pennsylvania Coal, First English, and Lucas.
Because the Corps' activity did not fail substantially to further
governmental interests and did not reduce property value below the
economically viable use standard, Tabb Lakes' status was similar to
that of the unsuccessful claimants in Penn Central, Agins, and
192. Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 404, 33 U.S.C. 1344 (1988).
193. Whitney Benefits, 926 F.2d at 1174.
194. See, e.g., Patrick Kennedy, Comment, The United States Claims Court: A
Safe "Harbor"from Government Regulation of Privately Owned Wetlands, 9 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 723 (1992); Thomas Hanley, Comment, A Developer's Dream: The

United States Claims Court's New Analysis of Section 404 Takings Challenges, 19
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 317 (1991).

195. See, e.g., Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381 (1988)
(plaintiffs' and defendant's motions for summary judgment denied).
196. See, e.g., id. at 385-86 (ripeness challenge rejected).
197. For example, in 1991 the Federal Circuit in Whitney Benefits tacked interest
dating from 1977 onto the more than sixty million dollar judgment. Whitney Benefits,
926 F.2d at 1178.
198. Loveladies Harbor, 21 Cl. Ct. at 160-61.

199.
200.
201.
202.

Florida Rock, 21 Cl. Ct. at 175-76.
Whitney Benefits, 926 F.2d at 1174, 1178.
Formanek, 26 Cl. Ct at 340-41.
See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
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Keystone. 20 3 Judge Nettesheim, in considering Tabb Lakes' claim that
the Cease and Desist Order improperly issued by the Corps effected
a temporary regulatory taking, 204 had the benefit of the Court's
discussion in Lucas. As this was not a physical invasion case and
because the facts indicated "that plaintiff was not deprived of all
economically viable use of its property, ' 20 5 neither "categorical"
approach was appropriate. 2°6
Instead, Nettesheim, relying on the majority's dismissal of Justice
Stevens' criticism in footnote eight of Lucas,20 7 found it appropriate
20
at that stage to consider the Penn Central "ad hoc" factors: 1
Thus Lucas appears to allow the proposition that a plaintiff need not suffer total deprivation of economic value in
order to have suffered a taking. In the absence of a categorical
taking, the Court reaffirmed the necessity for a traditional
factual inquiry into the character of the government action
and its economic impact on plaintiff. In other words, in taking
stock of the economic impact of a regulation, if the regulation
has deprived a property owner of all economically viable use
of its property, the inquiry need proceed no further. If less
than a deprivation of all economically viable use is found, a
court is to consider the other factors enunciated in Penn
Central.209
This approach is quite consistent with the logical flow of Justice
Scalia's argument in Lucas. Scalia concludes the paragraph in which
he introduces "[tihe second situation in which we have found categorical treatment appropriate" with the Agins takings formulation,
adding special emphasis to the phrase "or denies an owner economically viable use of his land."21 0 Thus, the Lucas majority equates total
deprivation (and the second categorical approach) with the denial of
economically viable use. Only when there is a less-than-total deprivation should the decision-maker consider the nature of the govern203. See, e.g., supra note 52 and accompanying text.
204. Tabb Lakes, 26 Cl. Ct. at 1343.
205. Id. at 1348.
206. Id. at 1351.
207. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2895 n.8 (1992).
See supra note 37.
208. Tabb Lakes, 26 Cl. Ct. at 1350.
209. Id. at 1351.
210. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893-94 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S.
255,260 (1980)) (emphasis added in Lucas).
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ment action and the specific investment-backed expectations of the
claimant in an attempt to balance private use and public need.
Three of the Court of Claims cases included in the lower half of
Table III include analyses that are inconsistent with this attentive
reading of Lucas. As noted above, the diminutions in value found by
the court in Loveladies Harbor, Florida Rock, and Formanek, although significant, were not absolute. Yet, in all three cases, the court
cited the bipartite Agins formulation and used the Penn Central
factors in order to determine whether a denial of economically viable
21
use had occurred. 1
In a post-Lucas world, Florida Rock and Formanek would fall
outside the scope of Table III. Because some value remained in the
effected parcels, the multi-factor analysis represented in Table II
would be more appropriate. As the court in Loveladies Harbor
determined that the substantial nexus condition had not been satisfied,
this case would join Nollan in the upper-right corner of the postLucas table. These changes are illustrated in Table IV.
Are the changes between Tables III and IV of any significance?
After all, the outcome of a specific takings challenge should be the
same regardless of whether the Penn Central factors are used before
or after the court determines remaining value. The full impact of the
Lucas Court's strategy cannot be appreciated, however, unless we
of conceptual severance included in Scalia's
consider the discussion
21 2
footnote.
seventh
As long as the Court continues to employ the relatively expansive
"parcel-as-a-whole approach" that we identify with Justice Brennan's
opinion in Penn Central,2 3 the likelihood of an ultimate judicial
finding of absolute deprivation is not great. 21 4 Government officials
the
will take advantage of the opportunity to impress upon the 2court
5
regulation.
challenged
the
of,
need for, and appropriateness
211. See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 155 (1990);
Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161, 168 (1990); Formanek
v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 332, 335 (1992). In Formanek, the court's calculation of
deprivation is particularly problematic. Judge Robinson accepted plaintiffs' appraiser's "opinion that without the fill permit, plaintiffs' entire parcel [112 acres] is worth
perhaps $1,000 an acre." Formanek, 26 Cl. Ct. at 340. Compared to a pre-regulation
value of over $900,000, this is a substantial diminution. However, when compared
to the $18,000 price paid in 1960 by one of the plaintiffs (Formanek) for a 160-acre
parcel that included the 112 acres in dispute, $112,000 is far from paltry. Id. at 333.
212. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7. See supra notes 70, 74.
213. See supra note 71.

214. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
215. See, for examples, supra Table III and infra Table IV, and the cases
included in the upper right box.
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If, however, enough Justices join Chief Justice Rehnquist in an
effort to narrow the focus of the takings inquiry to a smaller, discrete
slice of property, 216 the chances that a court would use a categorical
(per se) approach would be enhanced. Public sector advocates' arguments over the desirability of the regulation would thus be irrelevant
unless counsel could squeeze the challenged regulation into the confines of the nuisances-plus exception.
The litigation involving Loveladies Harbor's residential development plans in Long Beach Township, New Jersey illustrates the risks
public regulators face in the relaxation or abandonment of Brennan's
parcel-as-a-whole test. In one of the Claims Court's most controversial
cases of late, 21 7 Chief Judge Smith, in rejecting the government's
motion for summary judgment, 28 confined the scope of the takings
analysis to the 12.5 acres affected by the Corps' denial of a fill
permit. 219 One critic offers this description of the court's process of
whittling down the parcel:
Based on its interpretation of the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Keystone, the Loveladies court began by restricting
its analysis to the 57.4 acres that the plaintiff owned when the
taking occurred. The court then went beyond Keystone by
arguing that not all properties held at the time of the taking
always can be considered as part of the parcel as a whole.
Subsequently, the court refused to consider 38.5 of these 57.4
acres because the Corps almost certainly would deny a permit
to develop those areas. Finally, the court excluded 6.4 of the
remaining 18.9 acres from consideration, because these 6.4
220
acres were no longer contiguous with the 12.5 acres at issue.

44.

216. See supra note 73.
217. See, e.g., Hanley, supra note 194, at 725; Kennedy, supra note 194, at 341-

218. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 399 (1988).
219. Id. at 391-93.
220. Hanley, supra note 194, at 345 (footnotes omitted). See also Kennedy,
supra note 194, at 744 (footnotes omitted):
When deciding what constitutes the parcel as a whole, the Claims Court
sets aside its own decision in Deltona Corp. v. United States [657 F.2d 1184
(Ct. Cl. 1981)], which looked at the original parcel and compared it to the
value of what was left after the government action. This comparison was
made despite the fact that the developer, Deltona Corp., already sold a
large portion of the original parcel. While it is true that the Deltona court's
comparison of the original purchase to what was left after the government
action was one of a few considerations, it was a consideration nonetheless.
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At the trial stage, Chief Judge Smith had little trouble finding that
the effect of the permit denial on the 12.5 acres was devastating as
he noted that "the value of the property virtually has been eradicated
22
as a result of government action." 1
The critics of Smith's approach in Loveladies Harborinclude his
colleague, Judge Nettesheim. In Tabb Lakes, there was no need to
choose between defendant's and plaintiff's parcel-as-a-whole
"scenarios ' 22 2 because, even using the smaller parcel, "[tihe undisputed facts of record support a finding that any losses suffered by
plaintiff could amount to no more than a mere diminution in

value ....

*"223

Still, Nettesheim, noting plaintiff's reliance on Love-

ladies Harbor, cautioned that the 1990 decision was "currently on
appeal to the Federal Circuit [and] runs contrary to the established
precedents of Deltona and Jentgen."224
The Smith/Nettesheim conflict in the Claims Court is indicative
of the unstable nature of takings law today, particularly in cases
involving environmental regulation of land use. Moreover, now that
the Supreme Court has simplified its approach to total takings cases,
the ramifications of this conflict are even greater than before Lucas.
Unless, and until, the Court settles this issue, public and private sector
advocates will be called upon to provide competing delineations of
the parcels upon which the public regulation has had a negative
impact. For the time being, determining the parcel-as-a-whole is a
major component of each side's dispute resolution strategy.
IV.

PLANNING STRATEGY: TAKINGS TERM II's LEGACY FOR THE

ADVOCATE

Now that a year has passed since the conclusion of Takings Term
II, we have gained some perspective on how Lucas, Yee, and PFZ
The Loveladies Harbor court backed its decision to ignore Deltona by
claiming that it does not want to be tied to a rigid rule requiring it to
consider the original purchase. It then turns around and adopts a more rigid
rule, which considers only the value of the property which is left after the
government action. The court failed to recognize that the Deltona decision
did not choose one factor over another, but rather considered all of them
together.
221. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 160 (1990).
222. Tabb Lakes, Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 1334, 1346 (1992).
223. Id. at 1352.
224. Id. at 1346 n.17. See also id. at 1346: "Under both Deltona and Jentgen
[v. United States, 657 F.2d 1210 (Cl. Ct. 1981)], even if there was interference with
plaintiff's ability to use or develop wetlands property, so long as there are valuable
economic rights remaining in the property as a whole, compensation must be denied."
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build on the judicial offerings of the past. As noted above, counsel
and courts have begun to include the latest Supreme Court takings
cases into their litany of relevant precedent. 225 In order to make a
difference in outcome, however, advocates involved in extant and
potential takings litigation involving land-use and environmental reg-

ulation need to move beyond the mere recitation of new case cites
and quotations to the active incorporation of the latest judicial
theories into concrete disputes. Table V offers two blueprints for

planning that move: an attack strategy for private use proponents and
a defense. strategy for those seeking to justify public regulation.

TABLE V
PLANNING A TAKINGS CASE STRATEGY

THE ATTACK STRATEGY:
factors for private sector
advocates to emphasize

THE DEFENSE STRATEGY:
factors for public sector
advocates to emphasize

1. No value remains In pertinent
slice of property and regulation Is
post-common-law

1. Value remains in parcel as a
whole

2. Even It value remains, no
substantial nexus between ends
and means
3. Even If value remains, balance
tilts In favor of landowner
4. Govarnment-Imposed
occupation
5. Govemment activity is arbitrary
and capricious

2. Even if no value remains,
nuisance-based restriction
3. Even if no value remains.
balance tilts In favor of
government
4. No actual coerced, physical
occupation
5. Conceivably rational basis for
regulation

225. For a sampling of recent cases, see supra notes 33, 96-98.
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The first factor 2 6 for private sector advocates derives directly
from the majority opinion in Lucas. If the claimant can demonstrate
to the court that the case involves total deprivation, a task made
easier if the decision-maker focuses only on the property directly
affected by the regulation, the battle is all but won unless the
regulation is merely a modern version of a common-law restriction.
Even if value remains in the parcel at issue the cause is not lost if the
facts indicate227 that the regulation is not substantially related to
legitimate governmental goals (factor two); that, on balance, the
diminution in value is not offset by a compelling public need (factor
three); that the regulation effects even a slight physical occupation of
private property (factor four); or that the government's actions (or
inaction) are so arbitrary, capricious, or beyond the bounds of reason
as to amount to a substantive due process violation (factor five).
Those defending government regulation from takings claims have
an equally effective set of tools. By demonstrating that, even after
the regulation, the parcel-as-a-whole retains any value, government
counsel can avoid the categorical approach employed in Lucas (factor
one). Even a finding of total deprivation will not be fatal if the public
sector advocate can convince the court that this is an instance of
either redundant or responsive regulation (factor two). 228 In the more
likely event that the court finds that the property retains some value,
counsel should emphasize the pressing need for government action
(factor three). When the private user alleges that a case of physical
occupation is presented, the public sector advocate should advise the
court that, before applying the Loretto categorical treatment, there
must be a demonstration of actual, government-compelled invasion
(factor four). Similarly, allegations that the government has abused
its power should be met by cautioning the decision-maker that, as
long as there remains a conceivably rational basis for the challenged
regulatory activity, it would be inadvisable to depart from the deference normally accorded legislators and administrators (factor five).
Table V is by no means a detailed "checklist to takings litigation. ' ' 229 Rather, by treating leading takings decisions as tools for the
226. There is nothing magical about the order of the factors presented in Table
V. It is always up to counsel to decide, based upon the facts and the law, which are
the strongest and weakest arguments and which precedents provide the firmest
support.
227. If the facts don't so indicate, move one. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
228. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
229. Several takings issues are not addressed by the chart, including among
others standing, finality, calculation of damages, and burden of proof.
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advocate, the table is intended to aid in the initial planning stages of
disputes that appear headed toward judicial resolution. Equally important to a command of the holdings, legal principles, and key
phrases garnered from leading cases is an understanding of the
jurisprudential mindset that spawned the various components of
takings law.
In the late nineteenth century, regulatory takings challenges, such
as that brought by breweries against state prohibition in Mugler,2a0
were dismissed out of hand by a Supreme Court that had erected and
maintained formal barriers between the police power and eminent
domain: "The exercise of the police power by the destruction of
property which is itself a public nuisance, or the prohibition of its
use in a particular way, whereby its value becomes depreciated, is
very different from taking property for public use, or from depriving
a person of his property without due process of law."123'
To Professor Morton Horwitz, Mugler is typical of the categorical
approach that dominated American jurisprudence before the turn of
23 2
the century:
Nothing captures the essential difference between the typical
legal minds of nineteenth- and twentieth-century America quite
as well as their attitude toward categories. Nineteenth-century
legal thought was overwhelmingly dominated by categorical
thinking-by clear, distinct, bright-line classifications of legal
phenomena. Late nineteenth-century legal reasoning brought
categorical modes of thought to their highest fulfillment. 23 3
As the nation approached the Progressive Era, legal theorists began
to label such a technique "formalistic and artificial. ' 234
The period stretching from Pennsylvania Coal through Penn
Centralwas marked by a different mindset as judges sought to achieve
a balance between competing claims of private need and public good.
Weaned from the absolutist approach of previous decades, judges
refused to choose sides, sitting instead as relativist arbiters in a wide
array of takings, due process, and equal protection challenges. This,
too, was typical of the times, for

230. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
231. Id. at 669.
232. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960:
THE Ciusis OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 28-29 (1992) (discussing Mugler).
233. Id. at 17.
234. Id. at 18.
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in the twentieth century, the dominant conception of the
arrangement of legal phenomena has been that of a continuum
between contradictory policies or doctrines. Contemporary
thinkers typically have been engaged in balancing conflicting
policies and "drawing lines" somewhere between them. Nineteenth-century categorizing typically sought to demonstrate
"differences of kind" among legal classifications; twentiethcentury balancing tests deal only with "differences of degree. "235
Table Ii and the "ad hoc factual inquiries" analysis used in regulatory
takings cases are quintessential illustrations of this notion of continuum.
What then do we make of the move in Lucas, prefigured ten
years before in Loretto, toward takings categories? At first glance,
this appears to be simply a return to the formalism of the past as
jurisprudence comes full circle. This cyclical view of legal thought,
though attractive to pro-regulatory critics who would group the
Rehnquist Court's conservatives with the laissez-faire jurists of a
century past, is inaccurate.
"Post-progressive" takings law builds on both sets of traditions.
Formalistic elements, such as the categorical approach used in total
takings and physical occupation cases, blend with balancing components, such as the Penn Central factors appropriate to less-than-total
deprivation regulatory takings challenges, to form a flexible, albeit
confusing, judicial response to fundamental questions concerning the
position held by private property in the modern regulatory state.
Attorneys need to attend to this jurisprudential synthesis if they
hope to serve their client's interests and to continue to move the law
of takings along a constructive path. For example, the Yees' counsel
learned that while the Court was willing to hear arguments regarding
the scope of the physical occupations "category," there was little
enthusiasm on the part of a majority of Justices to subject the rent
control scheme to Penn Central-type balancing. 23 6 Similarly, the South
Carolina Coastal Council received a costly lesson on how important
deprivation given the narrow scope of
it is to avoid a finding of total
23 7
exception.
nuisances-plus
the
The issues both decided and undecided by Takings Term II
highlight the tension between these two schools of legal thought. In
235. Id. at 17.

236. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.

237. See supra note 24.
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the coming years, we can expect the parcel-as-a-whole issue to be a
major battleground, for every opinion narrowing the scope of takings
review moves the court closer to the total deprivation, categorical
approach. Similarly, by confining the physical invasion category to
cases of actual and compelled occupation, the Justices shifted many
potential challenges to the balancing side of the equation.
For decades, the Supreme Court rarely concerned itself with cases
involving disgruntled property owners seeking to brand confiscatory
regulations as violative of the Fifth Amendment's takings and due
process protections. The promise of judicial oversight contained in
Euclid2 s went largely unfulfilled for the next several decades. 2 9 The
Court, in accordance with its desire not to sit as a "zoning board of
appeals," 2 chose to hear neither controversial nor typical land-use
cases .241
In the 1970s, the Court gradually began to participate in the
land-use area, at first by indirection, by selecting cases primarily
involving issues such as standing, civil liberties, and civil rights. 242 In
Penn Central, the Justices reentered the regulatory takings fray and
nearly each succeeding Supreme Court Term has produced at least
one more takings opinion.
Not surprisingly, given the diverse philosophical make-up of the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts, several of these public regulation cases
have engendered divisions on the Court 243 as well as some interesting
alliances. 2" This lack of unanimity is to be expected, especially as
members of the Court seem torn between two competing values. On
the one hand, Justices in a variety of land-use cases have promoted

238. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926)
(Court "le[ft] other provisions [of zoning] to be dealt with as cases arise directly
involving them").
239. It seemed otherwise just two years after Euclid, when, in Nectow v. City
of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), the Court found that the city's zoning ordinance
confiscated the plaintiff's property.
240. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 13 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting): "Our role is not and should not be to sit as a zoning board of appeals."
241. See HAAR & WOLF, supra note 10, at 193-94; HAGMAN & JUERGENSMEYER,
supra note 104, § 3.2, at 40.
242. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (standing); Young v.
American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (free speech); Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (race discrimination).
243. Penn Central, Keystone, Nollan, and Lucas, for example, all featured
heated dissents.
244. See Wolf, supra note 19, at 265-66.
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respect for new federalism by allowing state and local officials to
respond to modern social, technological, and economic conditions
245
despite allegations of federal constitutional and statutory violations.
These judges can find their inspiration not only in the rhetoric of
also in Justice Brandeis's notion of
contemporary politicians24 24but
7
states.
the
of
the laboratory
On the other hand, there has been a growing skepticism, particularly in environmental law cases, about the goals and tactics of
regulators. The popular press is rife with environmental regulation
horror stories-tales of "innocent" people imprisoned for the crime
of tampering with private property, 24 desert and prairie potholes that
government officials have labeled wetlands, 249 corporations driven to
the brink of bankruptcy and employees thrown out of work owing to
red tape and unrealistic restrictions, 250 overzealous regulators out to
245. The rent control cases, see supra note 78, are probably the best examples
of this deference. See also Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984)
(approving eminent domain scheme aimed at addressing land oligopoly); Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (rejecting challenge to historic
preservation program).
246. See, e.g., Ronald Reagan, Inaugural Address, 1981 Pub. Papers, 1, 2 (Jan.
20, 1981): "All of us need to be reminded that the Federal Government did not
create the States; the States created the Federal Government."
247. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1923) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting): "There must be power in the States and the Nation to remould, through
experimentation, our economic practices and institutions to meet changing social and
economic needs."
248. See, e.g., Walter Williams, Environmental Terror: Government Style, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 28, 1992, at 3 1A: "Bill Ellen is one week from beginning
a six-month prison sentence, four months of home detention and one year of
supervised release. What was Bill Ellen's crime? Did he rob or murder? Did he cheat
on taxes or car-jack someone? No, Mr. Ellen was judged guilty of a 'wetlands'
violation." See also H. Jane Lehman, Trials and Tribulations of Landowners, L.A.
TIMs, Oct. 18, 1992, at K2 (noting '.'growing backlash that has brought together an
increasing number of small-scale property owners fed up with what they view as
governmental interference in the name of environmental preservation and land use
planning").
249. See, e.g., NAHB Calls for Legislation to Protect Wetlands, Save Jobs, PR
NEWSWIRE, Oct. 17, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, PRNEWS File ("rules
and regulations which apply to Florida's marshy wetlands may be exactly the same
as for a landlocked pothole in the Nevada desert that rarely sees a drop of water");
Maura Dolan, Wetlands Law Swamped by Rising Tide of Criticism, L.A. TIMES,
July 5, 1991, at A25: "Administration sources say that some White House officials
...want to eliminate protection for vernal pools, prairie potholes, playa lakes and
other seasonal wetlands that are important breeding grounds for amphibians ....
The EPA wants to retain those protections."
250. See, e.g., Charles K. Lunt, "Environmentalist" Vigilantes off on an
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extort private lands for public use, 25 ' and government bans based on
bad science.2 2 Members of Congress have, at times, responded to
popular calls to rein in misguided and power-hungry bureaucrats.2 3
In recent years, federal judges have also responded by seeking to
rescue private users from the stranglehold of allegedly confiscatory
and arbitrary environmental laws and regulations.254
When the administration and agency officials responsible for
promulgating and enforcing regulations have expressed concerns about
the costs and efficacy of environmental protection, judges can easily
Emotional Witch Hunt, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Jan. 24, 1993, at 5: "Industrial bans,
regional environmental lockouts and the myriad other costly, operating restrictions
have caused industry downsizing and many company closures. The oil, mining and
timber industries alone have lost jobs numbering in the hundreds and hundreds of
thousands."
251. See, e.g., Charley Reese, Environmental Elitists Are Bent on Ending
People's Property Rights, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 27, 1993, at A22 (government
"resorts to subterfuge and in effect takes the property through zoning or environmental regulations"); Jonathan Adler, The Green Assault on Property, WASH. TIMES,
May 13, 1993, at Gl:
It is not easy being a private landowner these days. The proliferation of
environmental and other land use regulations has removed the private control
that was once associated with private property. In the Adirondacks, for
example, the Adirondack Park Agency limits more than 1 million acres of
private land to no more than one home per 43 acres.
252. See, e.g., Candace C. Crandall, Bad Science, Bad Law, SAN DIEGO UNIONTRIMUNE, May 23, 1993, at GI: "Widespread distortion of scientific evidence, aided
by scientific illiteracy among journalists and policymakers, has led to health and
environmental policies that are increasingly driven by advocacy and activism, by
emotion rather than reason." See also RONALD BAILEY, Eco-SCAM: THE FALSE
PROPHETS OF ECOLOGICAL APOLCALYPSE (1993); Stevenson Swanson, On 2d Thought,
Toxic Nightmares May be Unpleasant Dreams, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 1, 1991, at 1: "these
second thoughts on two toxic substances [dioxin and radium] illustrate the uncertainty
that underlies decisions that ultimately affect individual health and the public purse.
It turns out that making a judgment about risk is far from a science."
253. See, e.g., Department of Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 318(g)(1), 103 Stat. 701, 749 (1989):
No restraining order or preliminary injunction shall be issued by any court
of the United States with respect to any decision to prepare, advertise, offer,
award, or operate a timber sale or timber sales in fiscal year 1990 from the
thirteen national forests in Oregon and Washington and Bureau of Land
Management lands in western Oregon known to contain northern spotted
owls.
254. In addition to Lucas, Nollan, and First English, see, e.g., Robertson v.
Methow Valley Citizens' Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989) (Forest Service's environmental
assessment for private ski resort project was adequate). See also William W. Fisher
1II, The Trouble with Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. .1393, 1408-09 (1993) (discussing
Scalia's "cynicism regarding the inclinations of government officials").
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accommodate their desire to promote deference and healthy skepticism. 25 5 When, however, a "pro-environmental" administration takes
a more aggressive attitude, 25 6 the potential for conflict increases
considerably.
The next few years promise to be exciting ones for practicing and
academic lawyers active in the environmental and land-use areas. New
disputes will work their way through the judicial system and judges
will confront fact patterns that call for clarification and modification
of current principles. Only the passage of time will tell which case
law tools will prove most helpful to advocates, whether one jurisprudential mindset will prevail, and which values will predominate. With
a new presidency, new Court membership, and novel regulations on
the horizon, the future of takings law appears especially enigmatic.
However, by attending to the contributions made in cases such as
Lucas, Yee, and PFZ, we will certainly be more prepared for the
inevitable-Takings Term III.

255. See, e.g., Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360 (1989)
(no need for Corps of Engineers to prepare second supplemental Environmental
Impact Statement for dam project).
256. Perhaps the clearest symbol of the administration's commitment to a proenvironment agenda was Bill Clinton's choice of Senator Al Gore as his running
mate. See AL GORE, EARTH IN THE. BALANCE: ECOLOGY AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT
(1992). See also Edward Flattau, Assaulting Environmentalists, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER,
June 26, 1993, at 7B:

Op-ed pieces debunking various pollution threats and environmental
regulations have been appearing with increasing frequency, especially since
the Clinton-Gore administration has taken office.
A number of environment-bashing books are being released by freemarket think tanks, and some talk show hosts are seeking to attract audiences
by trashing the authenticity of everything from global warming to endangered species ....

These critics are trying to make Vice President Al Gore a symbol of
environmental extremism in the hope he will create a public backlash to
their favor ....

